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STRUCTURE OF THE MAINE COURT
SYSTEM, 1956-1991
Edward S. Godfrey*
The preamble to the Constitution of the United States declares
one purpose of the people in ordaining that Constitution to be the
establishment of justice; the preamble to the Maine Constitution
contains a similar declaration. Achievement of that purpose re-
quires, among many other things, that there be impartial tribunals,
accessible to all, for fairly and promptly resolving disputes based on
claims of right and for carrying out the resulting resolutions. The
judiciary has been the institution in American government most
conspicuously devoted to resolving such disputes. Other institutions
performing the same function, such as arbitral panels and adminis-
trative agencies in their adjudicative role, have found themselves
constrained to adopt a court-like mode of operation even when they
were created in part to escape from it: the felt need for at least min-
imal due process exerts a sort of gravitational force on most of our
decision-making institutions and holds them in procedural orbits de-
fined by the courts.'
From such considerations one might suppose that the quality and
efficiency of the courts would be among the prime concerns of the
American people and their representatives. Regardless of the sub-
stantive justice of the laws, it seems fairly certain that a breakdown
of institutional arrangements for deciding disputes and carrying out
judicial decisions would lead to grave social disorder; widespread de-
spair of getting institutional justice would lead to epidemic civil vio-
lence. Yet it has always been notoriously hard to achieve improve-
ments in the judicial system.2 It is easier to complain about slowness
in adjudication than to examine the system to find particular insti-
tutional features that cause unwarranted delay--easier to complain
* Dean and Professor Emeritus, University of Maine School of Law-; A.B., 1934,
Harvard University; J.D., 1939, Columbia University.
1. Even in administrative rulemaking (which in one aspect is a method of resolv-
ing potential disputes), legislators often impose requirements of notice, fair hearing,
and adherence to established procedural rules and other elements borrowed from the
domain of adjudicative due process. Due process constraint is not confined to official
bodies: private organizations are not free from the requirements of due process in
disputes with their members, for example. See, e.g., Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21
(D.C. Cir. 1947). See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for
Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1930).
2. "Improvements in the administration of justice unfortunately do not assist one
lawyer in competition with others. Hence they usually come from the legislature or
from judges and lawyers only in response to unusual public pressure." Warner &
Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During the Past Fifty
Years, 50 HARv. L Rav. 583, 609 (1937).
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about the performance of some judge than to identify and correct
institutional defects, thus diminishing the likelihood that abler per-
sons will ever serve in the judiciary.
Even when systemic causes of dysfunction have been identified, it
has been hard to convince those who have the authority to make the
necessary changes to expend the energy and political capital needed
to do so. An incumbent judicial bureaucracy - judges and their
supporting personnel - is seldom happier than any other bureau-
cracy at the prospect of changes in its organization, policies and pro-
cedures, changes that may adversely affect individual income, work-
load, status and perquisites. In particular, when those changes also
involve transfers of power from local to state officials, local office
holders can usually rationalize adherence to the status quo and mus-
ter support from their constituents for maintaining it.
As a general proposition, the public wants a strong and efficient
judiciary. But the establishment of justice competes with other im-
portant objectives of a civilized society, such as education, public
health, and relief from destitution. The public institutions set up to
realize our various social ideals and objectives necessarily compete
with one another for limited resources. In that competition, the judi-
cial system has two disadvantages: The need for structural improve-
ment of the judiciary rarely appears to legislators to be as pressing
as the needs of other social institutions, and changes that seem nec-
essary to a knowledgeable observer often involve arcane technical
considerations that are hard to explain to the citizenry at large. Ef-
fective structural change must usually be initiated by individuals
who understand how the system operates as a whole and who are
civic-minded enough to work to improve it despite possible loss of
some personal advantage.
A leader who initiates improvement of the judicial system will
have the support of citizens who understand the importance of the
courts as an essential element in the establishment of justice and
who will insist on a high priority for the resources needed for it. The
resources in question are not merely money. They also include a
constitutional and statutory framework permitting effective manage-
ment of personnel, buildings and equipment, enough autonomy to
make adjustments within the system promptly as need develops,
and periodic assessment, internal and external, of the performance
of the resulting arrangements.
During the past thirty-five years, with the strong support of three
successive chief justices of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the
judicial system of Maine has undergone a remarkable transforma-
tion. The celebration by the Maine Law Review of the accomplish-
ments of Chief Justice McKusick provides an appropriate occasion
to take note of that transformation and his great contributions to it.
It would require more space than a celebratory article should take
to set forth a complete history of the ground swell of court reform
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that began in Maine in 1957 and seems not even yet to have spent
its force. Such a history would recount the activities of many per-
sons, mostly judges and lawyers, but also lay members of the Legis-
lature and executive department, whose efforts helped bring about
the changes described in this essay. A full account would also ex-
plore the social and economic forces beneath the nationwide move-
ment for court reform in the past fifty years, of which the Maine
development is a particular manifestation.
A full account would show in detail the linkage between the re-
structuring of the courts and the great changes in the substantive
law of the state during the same thirty-five years. In a barrage of
statutes, the Legislature has extensively revised the substantive law
of Maine during that period. Great changes have been enacted in
commercial, banking and corporate law, the criminal law, family law,
the law of decedents' estates and guardianships, environmental law,
the law of debtor and creditor, administrative law, municipal law
and labor law. Also during the same period, revolutionary changes
occurred in American constitutional law- court-appointed counsel
for indigent defendants became required;3 persons accused of crimes
were given new protection in the state courts from admission of We-
gally obtained or intrinsically unreliable evidence;4 due process
rights were recognized for children, debtors and institutionalized
persons;5 and women and various minority groups gained greater
rights to equal protection.6 Federal legislation controlling the uses of
land and other resources proliferatedJ as did consumer-protective
and welfare statutes and regulations.8 Those changes in American
3. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (all prosecutions resulting
in imprisonment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (persons accused of
felonies). In Newell v. State, 277 A.2d 731 (Me. 1971), the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, sitting as the Law Court, held that indigent defendants who face criminal
charges that may result in imprisonment for more than six months or a fine of more
than $500 must be informed of their right to appointed counsel and, absent waiver,
have such counsel appointed.
4. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (compelled self-incrimination);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegally obtained evidence).
5. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (confined mentally ill);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (debtors); Johnson v. Avery, 393 US. 483
(1969) (prisoners); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (minors).
6. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (women); Loring v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (anti-miscegenation law); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (ra-
cial discrimination in housing market); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (Indian
tribes).
7. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (1970) (environmental protection); ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 38, cl. 2 (envi-
ronmental protection), ch. 3 (protection of waters), ch. 4 (protection of air), ch. 13
(waste management), & ch. 19 (coastal management). See generolly J DAVIDSON & O
DELOGU. FEDERAL ENVIRONmENTAL REGULATION (1989).
8. For consumer protective legislation, see, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (current version at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41 (1988));
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law, combined with extensive changes in Maine statutory law, re-
sulted in an increasing burden for all Maine courts, not merely in
the amount of litigation but in its complexity and in the amount of
judicial time required to deal with it.
The reorganization of the Maine courts can thus be viewed in two
aspects: as a local response to the national movement for court re-
form and, within Maine itself, as one element in an extensive over-
hauling of the entire legal system of the state. Although this essay
will not discuss in any detail the relationship of structural change to
the revision of substantive law, the linkage cannot be totally ig-
nored, for the contemporaneous changes in substantive law have in-
creased the primary burden on the courts of resolving disputes
fairly, according to law, intelligently, and as promptly as possible.
When Robert B. Williamson was appointed Chief Justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in 1956, the judicial system of the
state lagged behind that of many American states in the efficiency of
its organization and procedures. Hard-to-change statutes, rather
than rules of court, supplied many important rules of practice. The
common law writs and forms of action and common law methods of
pleading were still entrenched in the statutes, albeit sometimes in
modified form.' Although the Supreme Judicial Court had authority
to make all rules for the regulation of equity practice as long as the
rules did not contravene existing statutes, it had no statutory au-
thority to make other rules of procedure applicable generally to the
trial courts. Except for rules of equity practice, the superior court
could make its own rules.'" The probate courts were also authorized
Truth in Lending Regulations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 ("Regulation Z") (1990); Maine Un-
fair Trade Practices Act, P.L. 1969, ch. 577, § 1 (current version at ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, ch. 10 (1989 & Supp. 1990)); Maine Consumer Credit Code, P.L. 1973, ch.
762, § 1 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A (1980 & Supp. 1990)). For
welfare legislation, see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, ch. 1071 (child and family
services and child protection), and ch. 261-A (prevention of handicapping conditions)
(Supp. 1990).
9. See, e.g., R.S. ch. 112 (1954), entitled "Commencement of Civil Actions." See
also address by Justice Francis W. Sullivan to the Maine State Bar Association, 45
ME. ST. BAR Ass'N PROC. 38, 42-43 (Aug. 28-30, 1956):
Our declaration in trover is fiction and uninformative. Our replevin
pleading is a feat of memory. Pleading in a suit upon an indemnity bond is
really formidable. Our law pleadings do not inform parties, attorneys or the
court of bona fide issues and when read in openings to juries are in their
technical verbiage soporific. Getting in and out of the Law Court is too
complicated and technical. Review and Error should not be separate actions
by themselves but simple furtherances of the original suits. Joinder of
causes between the same parties and counterclaims should be permitted
without restraint.
10. R.S. ch. 106, § 6 (1954) provided:
The justices of the superior court may adopt rules governing the proceed-
ings in said court, but until such rules are adopted and published, the rules
of the supreme judicial court shall govern the proceedings unless inconsis-
[Vol. 43:353
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to make their own rules and devise their own forms, again subject to
approval of the Supreme Judicial Court.' The municipal courts op-
erated under procedural rules established by their several charters.
Rules relating to pleadings and appellate review were riddled with
nice distinctions often having little relevance to substantive merit.
The distinction between law and equity was maintained in various
ways. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court and the superior
courts had concurrent jurisdiction in equity. A justice of the Su-
preme Judicial Court could preside over a case in equity and often
did so,12 while trials of actions at law with a jury were reserved for
the superior court. Dozens of independent municipal courts and lo-
cal trial justices, with narrowly limited jurisdiction, operated with
little supervision.13 Their decisions in the minor cases over which
they had jurisdiction were reviewable in the superior court by trials
de novo. The superior court also held trials de nouo of contested
issues of fact on appeals from the probate courts.
Although the Supreme Judicial Court had by statute "general su-
perintendence of all inferior courts for the prevention and correction
of errors and abuses where the law [did] not expressly provide a
remedy,"' 4 the court had ruled in 1856 that it could only exercise
judicial power by means afforded by the common law, i.e., by one of
the common law writs, such as quo warranto, mandamus or certio-
tent with the provisions of this chapter. The supreme judicial court shall
take judicial notice of the rules of the superior court.
The provision was repealed by P.L. 1963, ch. 226, § 2.
11. R.S. ch. 153, § 50 (1954). The problem of idiosyncratic procedures and forms
in the probate courts was an old one. P.L. 1895, ch. 17, § I had tried to deal with it by
creating a commission of probate judges and registers, appointed by the governor, to
prepare rules of probate practice and procedure and devise forms for use in the pro-
bate courts when approved by the Supreme Judicial Court. The provisions for such a
commission did not disappear from the statutes until 1971. P.L. 1971, ch. 94, § 2. By
virtue of P.L. 1979, ch. 540, § 1, the Supreme Judicial Court acquired authority to
prescribe rules and forms for the probate courts. That authority is now contained in
MF. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-304 (1981). Also, the civil rules enabling statute,
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 8, was amended to include probate rules by P.L 1983,
ch. 653.
12. INSTrruTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN, Tan SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT AND TriE SUPE-
moR COURT OF THE STATE OF MAINE, January 1971, at 1, 3, 4, 6 (hereinafter 1971 IJA
REPORT]. As recently as the time of that report, about half the time of the justices of
the Supreme Judicial Court was spent on trial work. That time was again divided
about equally between civil nonjury cases and habeas corpus proceedings. Id. at 3. An
administrative problem was created by the justices' practice of taking on trial work
without notifying the chief justice.
13. H. HENRY. THE MAINE DisTRicT CouR. A QuARTER CENTURY OF Pnocass 31
(1987). The author is much indebted to Judge Henry's history of the district court, as
he is also to Silsby, History of the Maine Superior Court, 14 ME. BAR BULL 109 (pt.
I); 149 (pt. II) (1980).
14. RMS. ch. 103, § 7 (1954) (current version at ME. REv. STAT, ANN, tit. 4, § 7
(1989)). The provision first appears in R.S. ch. 96, § 4 (1840).
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rari, served by a complaint on one or more adverse parties."0 With
such a cautious view of its judicial power, it is not surprising that
the high court never undertook to extend control over the manage-
ment of other courts of Maine without enabling legislation.
Both the Supreme Judicial Court and the superior courts de-
pended in 1956 on the sixteen boards of county commissioners for
support personnel, including clerks of court, and for courtrooms,
chambers, and even furniture."6 Terms of the superior court in the
several counties were mandated by statute,1 7 and the nettlesome
task of assigning justices to meet the statutory term requirements
fell to the chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Court.15 Indeed, a
principal duty of the chief justice was keeping track of itinerant su-
perior court justices and moving them about to meet emergencies as
they arose.
The term system for the superior court complicated the task of
deploying justices to deal with the caseload in counties with the
heaviest calendars, and it promoted delay in the trial of cases in
counties where the statute prescribed only two or three terms per
year.1 9 In such counties a continuance could cause a built-in delay of
several months in the disposition of cases. Moreover, many justices
were lenient in granting continuances when the lawyers for both
sides agreed to them. A last minute continuance or settlement often
left the presiding justice in a rural county with little or nothing to
do for the rest of the day on which the case had been set for trial.
15. Ex parte Davis, 41 Me. 38 (1856). The case did not involve "superintendence"
of an "inferior court." The Governor of Maine had notified Justice Davis of the Su-
preme Judicial Court that he had been removed from office after proceedings in the
House and Senate that Davis contended were not in compliance with the Maine Con-
stitution. Davis presented a memorial to the Supreme Judicial Court, describing in
some detail the acts of the Governor and Legislature in the matter and requesting a
determination that those acts had been unconstitutional and that he was entitled to
his office. The court, with one dissent, held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain
such a memorial. Davis must proceed under some writ, said the court, and name one
or more adverse parties.
16. R.S. ch. 89, § 18 (1954), repealed P.L. 1987, ch. 737, Part A, § 1.
17. R.S. ch. 106, § 11 (1954), repealed and replaced by P.L. 1969, ch. 57, repealed
and replaced by P.L. 1975, ch. 408, § 9 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4,
§ 110 (1989)). There were no statutory term times for hearing of appeals by the Su-
preme Judicial Court sitting as the Law Court, but R.S. ch. 103, § 11 (1954) provided
that the Law Court must hold eight sessions per year at times and places to be deter-
mined by the chief justice and announced before December 1 of each year.
18. R.S. ch. 106, § 1 (1954) (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 101
(1988).
19. 1971 IJA REPORT, supra note 12, at 8-12. By the time of the Institute report,
the statutory prescription of the terms in each county had been eliminated, but the
chief justice was still required to determine in advance the times when terms would
be held in each county. Among other evils, the term system caused undue delay in
hearing cases where persons had been incarcerated in county jails for inability to
make bail pending trial.
[Vol. 43:353
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Practically speaking, the attorneys, not the justices, controlled the
docket. Notoriously, the workloads of the justices varied greatly, and
the time spent in travel over long distances between shire towns was
considerable.
No one officer or official body had constitutional or statutory re-
sponsibility for operation of the judicial system as a whole. The
chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, though designated by
statute "head of the Judicial Department,"20 had little effective con-
trol over the management of the trial courts except by moral suasion
and the authority to assign the circuit-riding superior court justices
to preside at various locations of that court. Finally, the judiciary
had no reporting system that would yield the information required
for gauging accurately the growing needs of all the courts. It was
chronically difficult for the chief justice to make a case in the Legis-
lature for additional judges, facilities, or emergency support
personnel.
Fortunately there was one institution in Maine already estab-
lished and functioning that was charged by statute with making "a
continuous study of the organization, rules and methods of proce-
dure and practice of the judicial system of the State, the work ac-
complished and the results produced by that system and its various
parts.121 That institution was the Judicial Council of Maine, created
by statute in 1935.22 Under the leadership of Chief Justice William-
son, ex officio chair of the Council, and spurred by the demands of a
number of judges and lawyers dissatisfied with existing arrange-
20. &S. ch. 103, § 1 (1954) (current version at M. REv. STAT. ANN- tit. 4. § 1
(1989)).
21. R.S. ch. 153, §95 (1954) (current version at Ma. REv. STAT ANN. tit. 4, §51
(Supp. 1990)). At present the Council must be composed of the chief justice, who
serves as chair, the attorney general, the chief justice of the superior court, the chief
judge of the district court, the chairs of the joint standing committee of the Legisla-
ture (or their designees) having jurisdiction over judiciary matters, and the dean of
the "University of Maine System School of Law" [sic], each to serve ex officio, and an
active or retired justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, one justice of the superior
court, one judge of the district court, one judge of a probate court, one clerk of the
judicial courts, two members of the bar, and six members of the public to be ap-
pointed by the governor. The surveillance mission of the Maine Judicial Council has
always been similar to that of the Massachusetts Judicial Council established by 1924
Mass. Acts ch. 244, (current version at MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 221, §§ 34A, 34B,
34C (West 1958 & Supp. 1990)). For an early survey of the judicial council movement
in the United States, see Pirsig, A Survey of Judicial Councils, Judicial Conferences
and Administrative Directors, 47 THE BRma" 181 (1952).
The Maine Judicial Council seems to have been quiescent, if not moribund, before
Chief Justice Williamson began employing it as an instrument for change. "Mr. Presi-
dent, Mr. President-elect, and your Excellency, I suggest that action be taken to
bring back to life the Maine Judicial Council. The job it was created to do is too
important for it to be long asleeping." Address of Frank M. Coffin to the Maine State
Bar Association, 40 M. ST. BAR Ass'N PROC. 86, 90 (1951).
• 22. P.L. 1935, ch. 52.
1991]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
ments, that body began at long last to address the problems created
by the disarray of the Maine judicial establishment.
The first step was to obtain for the Supreme Judicial Court statu-
tory authority to prescribe rules of civil procedure in both law and
equity for practice before the supreme, superior and municipal
courts and trial justices. Legislation in 1957, as amended in 1959,
enacted that authorization, with two new and crucial provisions:
first, that the court could thereafter repeal, amend or add to such
rules with or without a waiting period and, second, that after the
effective date of the rules all laws in conflict with them were to be of
no further force or effect.23 With the help of an advisory committee
of experienced lawyers and with Professor Richard Field of Harvard
Law School and Mr. Vincent L. McKusick of Portland as consul-
tants, the Supreme Judicial Court was ready by the summer of 1959
to promulgate the new civil rules, which became effective December
1, 1959.24 To avoid even the possibility of conflict between the new
rules and the old laws, an elaborate statute, effective December 1,
1959, directly repealed or amended laws in conflict with the new
rules.2 5
The enabling acts of 1957 and 1959 did not authorize the Supreme
Judicial Court to make rules for the probate courts, which continued
until 1981 to operate under their own rules and with their own
blank forms, subject, however, to approval of the Supreme Judicial
Court. The story of the probate courts and the resistance in the Leg-
islature to their integration with the rest of the judicial system will
be told later in this essay.26
As its principal method of making a "continuous study" of the
judicial system, the Judicial Council on several occasions between
1959 and 1981 retained the Institute of Judicial Administration to
make reports on various features of the Maine judicial establish-
ment. It was a report to the Legislature by the Institute in 1961 that
led to creation of the Maine District Court, to supplant the munici-
pal courts and trial justices. The Judicial Council and influential
23. P.L. 1957, ch. 159, amended by P.L. 1959, ch. 309 (current version at ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 8 (1989)). The rules-enabling statute gave the court authority to
write rules for actions at law as well as for suits in equity "so as to secure one form of
civil action and procedure for both." The 1957 statute did not eliminate the authority
of the superior court to issue its own rules for actions at law. That concurrent but
conflicting authority survived until 1963. See supra note 10.
24. The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure and the Municipal Court Civil Rules were
promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court on June 1, 1959, to become effective
December 1 of that year. Order of Promulgation, 155 Me. 477 (1959).
25. P.L. 1959, ch. 317. See R. FIELD & V. McKusICK, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE vi
(1959).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 63-81.
27. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A DISTRICT COURT FOR MAINE: REPORT
TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMITTEE OF MAINE ON THE DESIRABILITY OF INTE-
GRATING ACTIVITIES OF MUNICIPAL COURTS AND TRIAL JUSTICES. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
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members of the bar had complained for years about the defects of
the local courts: lack of uniformity of procedure and sentencing
practices, gross disparity of caseloads among the judges, lack of liai-
son between the local courts and service agencies, and waste of court
resources resulting from the provision for trials de novo of cases on
appeal.28
Although mere replacement of the old local courts by a new local
court system need not have resulted by itself in greater efficiency
and accountability, the 1961 statute establishing the statewide dis-
trict court system had significant centralizing features. First, the
statute made clear that the district court was one court, not a collec-
tion of independent courts, even though judges were to preside in
many divisions. It was to have one chief judge, and all the judges of
the court were to operate under one set of rules and one schedule of
fees. The chief judge had authority to appoint all clerks and make
necessary arrangements for courtroom facilities. All fines, bail for-
feitures, and fees collected in any division were to go into one dis-
trict court fund maintained by the state treasurer. Out of that fund
the state treasurer was to pay the expenses of the court in accor-
dance with a budget submitted by the chief judge. There was to be
no pulling and hauling with municipal officials over the funding of
the district court or appointment of its clerical staff.
The new court was not completely autonomous, of course. Its pro-
cedural rules were to be made by the Supreme Judicial Court.20 Its
chief judge, to be appointed from among the district court judges by
the chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, was to serve at the
chief justice's pleasure." The original 1961 act did not provide, how-
ever, that the chief justice was to supervise the chief judge in opera-
tion of the district court, except for whatever inference might be
drawn from a provision that the chief judge was to render an annual
report to the chief justice on "the state of business in the District
Court."3
Moreover, the Legislature itself retained control of the geographic
boundaries of the divisions of the district court and the designation
of the locations for holding court.32 The 1961 act grouped thirty-
COMhL PUBLICATION No. 100-4 [hereinafter 1961 IJA REPORT). The legislation creating
the district court was P.L. 1961, ch. 386, § 1 (current version at ME. REv. STAT ANN.
tit. 4, §§ 151-57, 162-64 (1989 and Supp. 1990)). The bill to create the district court
was passed by overwhelming votes after a tussle with defenders of county and munic-
ipal autonomy. HK HENRY, supra note 13, at 5-9.
28. 1961 IJA REPORT, supra note 27. The deficiencies are summarized in H.
HENRY, supra note 13, at 4.
29. P.L. 1961, ch. 386, § 1 (current version at MR. REv STAT ANN tit. 4, § 156(2)
(1989)).
30. Id. (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4. § 157(l) (1989)).
31. Id. (current version at MR. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 4, § 164(9)(1989)).
32. P.L. 1961, ch. 386, § 1 (current version at M. REv STAT ANN tit. 4. § 153
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three divisions into thirteen designated districts and required that
at least one resident judge be appointed in each district.3 3 That re-
quirement was designed, of course, to gratify rural and small-town
demands that some judge be reasonably close at hand to act
promptly on local matters. Yet a statutory provision that pins a
judge to one locality tends to create inefficiency in the deployment
of judges in response to need throughout the system. However, the
workloads in all districts became heavy enough that the resident
judges have seldom been idle.3 4 Since 1961, to handle the workload,
the Legislature has authorized eight at-large judges in addition to
the original one, and two resident judges in addition to the original
fourteen.35 Active retired district court judges are also available for
assignment by the chief judge.
As an institution, the district court was certainly an improvement
over the former collection of municipal courts and trial justices. The
replacement of part-time by full-time judges was in itself a great
advance. Despite the rising tide of cases and miserable working con-
ditions at some early court locations, a good esprit de corps devel-
oped within the court and its staff,3s fostered by a succession of vig-
orous and enthusiastic chief judges and promoted by the district
court conferences required by the 1961 act.
37
Yet the considerable independence enjoyed by the new district
court came at a price for the system as a whole. The budget for the
district court was not integrated with that for the Supreme Judicial
Court and superior courts. The 1961 act had no provisions requiring
equity in compensation of administrative and clerical staff among
the three courts.38 Although the district court held its own confer-
ences, there was no provision for continuing education of the judges
of all the courts. No system-wide reporting existed to show the kinds
and numbers of cases filed in Maine courts and their disposition. As
a result, it was difficult to assess accurately the cost in judicial re-
(1989 & Supp. 1990)). There are now 30 divisions of the district court as a result of
P.L. 1989, ch. 891, § A-2.
33. P.L. 1961, ch. 386, § 1 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 154
(1989 & Supp. 1990), reflecting frequent changes in composition of the districts).
34. Judge Henry reports 90,520 total filings in the district court in 1967. H.
HENRY, supra note 13, at 86. By 1988-1989, district court filings had steadily risen to
325,560. They dropped to 315,123 in fiscal year 1990. STATE OF MAINE JUDICIAL DEP'T..
ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1990, at 92 [hereinafter 1990 ANNUAL REPORTI.
35. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 38. Judges of the administrative court
may now be assigned by the chief justice to sit in the district court, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN.. tit. 4, § 1158 (1989), as may also superior court justices. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
4, § 120 (1989 and Supp. 1990).
36. H. HENRY, supra note 13, at 19, 38.
37. P.L. 1961, ch. 386, § 1 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 164(11)
(1989)).
38. See H. HENRY, supra note 13, at 38, referring to Chief Judge Browne's efforts
to rationalize the pay scales of personnel within the district court system itself.
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sources of particular procedures or of changes in the substantive law
and, hence, hard to estimate the need for reallocation of resources or
for new resources.
The 1961 act provided in section 7 that appeals from the district
court should be heard de novo in the superior court. However, the
same section empowered the Supreme Judicial Court to make and
amend rules for appeals from the district court. Acting under that
authorization, the Supreme Judicial Court lost little time in issuing
district court rules doing away with de novo trials in civil cases?3
Appeals in civil cases were thereafter to be on the record and on
questions of law only. The persistent problem of developing a trial
record in district court, where there was ordinarily no court stenog-
rapher, has been resolved over the years by increased use of super-
vised tape recordings. 40
In 1961, the Supreme Judicial Court did not yet have general stat-
utory authority to make rules of criminal procedure; hence it con-
fined the new District Court Rules to civil actions and made no
move to abolish appellate de novo trials in criminal cases. Even after
the court was authorized to promulgate rules of criminal procedure
for the district court and did so, it preserved the de novo appeal to
the superior court.41 The defendant's constitutional right to a jury
trial appeared to be at stake, there being no jury in district court.
De novo trials worked badly. Not only did they create an obvious
waste of judicial time, but they damaged morale: The district court
judges perceived their own labors in such cases to have been exer-
cises in futility, and the superior court justices were frustrated at
having to preside over duplicative trials of minor offenses that
should have been finally disposed of in the court of first instance.' 2
The appeal by trial de novo was not finally abolished until 1982,
after the Legislature had decriminalized most ordinary traffic of-
fenses and authorized the Supreme Judicial Court to make a rule
permitting defendants to waive their right to jury trial in criminal
cases and be tried in district court for minor crimes coming within
that court's jurisdiction. 3
39. The new District Court Civil Rules were promulgated on July 17, 1962. Fore-
word to Maine District Court Civil Rules, 158 Me. 537 (1962) (Williamson, CAJ.).
40. See MR. Civ. P. 76 H; M.R Crim. P. 27(b), 36 (A)(d), 36 (C)(d); M.R.S.C.P.
6(a).
41. M.D.C. Crim. R. 39(b), 161 Me. 549, 655 (1965).
42. H. HENRY, supra note 13, at 33. The de novo trial was strongly criticized in the
1971 IJA REPORT, supra note 12, at 31-32.
43. P.L. 1981, ch. 487, § 1 (current version at MF_ REv STAT. ANN tit. 15, § 2114
(Supp. 1990)). The rule now applicable is M.R. Crim. P. 22. An effort to limit to
serious crimes the constitutional right to jury trial had failed in State v. Sklar, 317
A.2d 160 (Me. 1974). The legislative decriminalization of traffic infractions was held
to have succeeded in State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703 (Me. 1983), so that defendants in
infraction cases no longer had a right to trial by jury.
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General satisfaction with the rules of civil procedure led the Leg-
islature in 1963 to authorize the Supreme Judicial Court to make
rules of criminal procedure. 44 Following the methods successfully
used for the civil rules in 1959, the court appointed an advisory
committee and consultant-for this project Professor Harry P.
Glassman of the University of Maine Law School-and after appro-
priate consideration promulgated, effective December 1, 1965, the
Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Maine District Court
Criminal Rules.45 As in 1959, conflicting statutes were simultane-
ously repealed.
Despite imperfections in the institutional arrangements for the
district court, the bench and bar generally perceived it as a great
improvement over the municipal courts and trial justices. The ra-
tionalization of procedure achieved by the civil and criminal rules
was also generally applauded. By the mid-1960's, as the proponents
of reform turned their attention to the probate courts and to the
superior court itself, the momentum for reform seemed strong.
Somewhat by chance, the effort to reconstitute the probate courts
became caught up with an unsuccessful effort to remove one particu-
lar source of inefficiency in the operation of the superior court.
One glaring defect in the arrangements for the superior court
arose from a long-standing provision that the clerk of the superior
court in each county was to be the county clerk of that county.40
Since 1842 the county clerks had been elected by popular vote in
their counties, originally for terms of three years,47 later for four.
They were county officers, paid by the county, and they served as
clerks of their boards of county commissioners. The anomaly of
their being in effect imposed on the superior court regardless of
qualifications or compatibility had been perpetuated to save money:
most of the county clerks had time on their hands in the old days,
especially in the rural counties where the clerks' duties for the
county commissioners were far from onerous. From the point of view
of the circuit-riding justices of the superior court, however, the obvi-
ous defect in control was a source of inefficiency and conflict.
In 1967 a bill was introduced in the 103d Legislature, apparently
without any supporting institutional study, to empower the chief
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court to appoint the clerks of court
44. P.L. 1963, ch. 226 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9 (1989)).
45. Promulgation Orders, Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure and District Court
Criminal Rules, 161 Me. iv (June 1, 1965, effective Dec. 1, 1965). For an account of
the preparation of the rules, see Williamson, Foreword to 3 H. GLASSMAN, MAINE
PRACTICE: RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED (1967).
46. R.S. ch. 89, § 95 (1954). The county clerk was also clerk of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court for the county. Id. As early as 1927, one of the recommendations of a
legislative committee studying the Maine court system had been to have the clerks of
court appointed by the court instead of elected. Silsby, supra note 13, at 170.
47. P.L. 1842, ch. 3, § 1.
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for the superior court.4 8 To placate local and anti-lawyer sentiments
expressed in the Legislature, the bill in amended form provided that
the clerk of courts in each county would be a resident of that county
and would not be required to be a lawyer. The incumbent clerks
were to serve out their elective terms. The bill eventually passed by
comfortable margins in both houses of the 103d Legislature.'
A bill was introduced in the 104th Legislature to repeal the 1967
act and reinstate the election of county clerks as county officers.10
During the preceding two years, in appointing clerks of court as
terms of the formerly elected clerks expired, Chief Justice William-
son had redesignated all but one of the elected incumbents who
wanted to continue serving in their appointive status. However, he
had not redesignated one incumbent who wanted to continue but
had been the subject of complaints by superior court justices on
grounds of inefficiency. The clerk in question was not of the same
political party as the Chief Justice and was replaced by a clerk who
was.
Legislators who had opposed the 1967 act making the clerks ap-
pointive supported the 1969 bill to repeal it. They argued that hav-
ing the county clerk on the county ticket could strengthen county
government;51 that an appointive county clerk was an elite, higher
paid officer in the court house, disruptive of morale;52 that the fact
that the Chief Justice had appointed all but one of the formerly
elected clerks showed that there was nothing to the argument about
qualification - that the electorate could pick qualified persons just as
well as a chief justice.53 One proponent of the repealer said he was
sure the appointment of clerks was just a preamble to an eventual
requirement that the clerks be lawyers." One legislator hinted
darkly that the bill was "politically motivated" but deemed that to
be a good reason for supporting it.55
It seems likely that some legislators who had supported the 1967
change had endured criticism for doing so from the local powers
back home. Whatever the causes or motives, the 104th Legislature
in 1969 repealed the 1967 act by a substantial margin.50 The re-
48. L.D. 354 (103d Legis. 1967). After amendment the bill passed, to become P.L.
1967, ch. 419. The measure provided that the clerks were still to be paid by the coun-
ties even though appointed by the chief justice. P.L. 1967, ch. 419. § 1.
49. The bill passed 21-11 in the Senate, 3 Legis. Rec. 3679 (1967). The House,
having originally defeated the bill without the amendment, voted 83-27 to recede and
concur with the Senate after the bill was amended. 2 Legis. Rec. 3384 (1967).
50. L.D. 791 (104th Legis. 1969).
51. 1 Legis. Rec. 1240 (1969) (Statement of Sen. Wyman).
52. 1 Legis. Rec. 1463 (1969) (Statement of Rep. Kelley).
53. 1 Legis. Rec. 1462 (1969) (Statement of Rep. Carey).
54. 1 Legis. Rec. 1463-64 (1969) (Statement of Rep. Kelley).
55. 1 Legis. Rec. 1465 (1969) (Statement of Rep. Jutras).
56. P.L. 1969, ch. 229, § 1. The last votes were 90 to 44 in the House, 1 Legis. Rec.
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pealer was not a model of draftsmanship, but its main purpose was
clear enough: Clerks of court for the Supreme Judicial Court and
superior courts were to be elected locally as before, not appointed by
the chief justice.
This contretemps did not mean the end of structural reform in
the Maine Legislature. That became apparent when in the same ses-
sion a bill was passed putting an end to the statutory term system
for the superior court.57 The act authorized the chief justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court to establish the times for holding terms of
the superior court in each county and to specify the business to be
conducted at such times. The effect of the measure was to enable
the chief justice to deploy the superior court justices more efficiently
to meet the demands of litigation. Although the change might have
been perceived as threatening a reduction in the number'of times
the superior court would sit in the less populous counties, the legis-
lative record does not reveal that any objection was raised on that
ground.
Proponents of modernizing the Maine courts might have drawn
two or three lessons from the lost battle over the county clerks. The
principal lesson, of course, was that structural change directly and
plainly reducing the power of local politicians would run into serious
difficulties, especially if it meant transforming elective local offices
into appointive state-level ones. It also appeared that where such a
change seemed needed, it would be wise to make it part of a general
plan of reform, supported by a thorough and convincing indepen-
dent study that would clearly justify the reduction in local power by
relating it to overall improvements in the operation of the system.
Finally, great care would have to be exercised to repel any inference
that proposed changes were prompted by partisan political motives.
It was in the context of the see-saw battle over the clerks that in
1967 the Legislature and the Judicial Council began to address the
need for change in the probate courts. Those courts were then and
still remain sixteen separate courts, not one court. There was and is
no chief judge on whom responsibility can be placed for satisfactory
performance of all the probate courts. The Maine Constitution itself
provided in 1967 that judges and registers of probate be indepen-
dently elected county officers.5 The fees collected in each probate
court went and still go to the county treasurer, not to the general
fund of the state.59
There were some obvious deficiencies in the structure of the pro-
bate courts. One was the absence of control by the probate judges
over their registers. Separate election gave the register an indepen-
1699 (1969), and 22 to 8 in the Senate, 1 Legis. Rec. 1392 (1969).
57. P.L. 1969, ch. 57. See supra note 17.
58. ME. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1964). See infra text at notes 72 and 73.
59. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-603 (Supp. 1990).
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dence from the probate judge that was unwarranted by the nature of
their working relationship. Though most of their duties are distinct,
in some matters their cooperation is necessary. Separate election of
the register as a county officer means that the judge has little au-
thority to deal with incompetence or insubordination.
A second flaw in the probate system in 1967 lay in the arrange-
ment for de novo review of probate court judgments by the superior
court. The resulting waste of judicial resources was not as disturbing
as it was in the case of criminal appeals from the district court with
its high volume of minor criminal cases. However, de nouo probate
appeals created some additional burden for the superior court and
manifested a legislative distrust of the probate courts.
The lack of any command structure within the probate system it-
self fostered a tendency for the probate court in each county to
adopt idiosyncratic local procedures and forms, to the vexation of
lawyers from outside the county who might be unaware of special
requirements. An effort had been made many years before to control
that phenomenon. Since 1895, a commission appointed by the gover-
nor, composed of probate judges and registers, had had responsibil-
ity for making rules and forms for the probate courts, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Judicial Court.60 That cumbersome device
had not been wholly effective to keep peculiar local procedures and
forms from proliferating."
The most serious defect in the structure lay in the part-time na-
ture of the probate judge's duties. Probate judges are required to be
lawyers and are authorized to practice law when not performing ju-
dicial duties. They are not permitted to act judicially in any matter
in which their clients have an interest.0 2 Yet the lawyer who is a
part-time judge has a latent edge in negotiating with other lawyers
who may someday have to appear on other matters before that law-
yer in court. Moreover, the danger of a conflict of interest is con-
stantly present.
The probate courts came under scrutiny in a report issued in 1967
by the Bureau of Public Administration of the University of Maine,
commissioned by a legislative committee on probate court revision. "
The Bureau was not given enough time to do a thorough study, and
its tentative suggestions rested on rather impressionistic findings. In
its summary, the report suggested that a district system for probate
60. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 351 (1964), repealed, as amended, by P.L. 1979,
ch. 540, § 7-A, effective Jan. 1, 1981.
61. INSTITUTE OF JUDiciAL ADMIN.. THE DEsiRABILrY OF INTEGRATING ACTIVmEs OF
THE PROBATE COURTS OF MAINE INTO THE SUPERIOR COURT 14 (Legislative Research
Committee Pub. No. 104-21) (1969) [hereinafter 1969 IJA REPORT).
62. ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 307 (1989).
63. BUREAU OF PUBLIC ADMIN. REPORT OF PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF TiHE FEASIBIL-
ITY OF A PROBATE DisTIri" CoURT SYSTEM FOR MAINE (Univ. of Maine, Project Report
No. 67-1) (1967).
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courts was feasible, with full-time appointive judges.64 The same
summary stated that the opinion of judges and lawyers seemed to be
that the probate function should not be attached to the superior
court or district court." The preference was for combining counties
into a few districts and having one probate judge ride circuit within
each district, with the registers, one per county, remaining at their
existing county seats.66 The probate district judges could constitute
one statewide probate court, perhaps headed by a chief judge." The
impression created by the report was that the existing system, de-
spite its theoretical defects, was not working too badly in practice
and that the bar viewed with a tolerant eye the phenomenon of the
judge's practicing law when off duty.6 8
Although the 1967 report seemed mild in its findings and rather
conservative in its suggestions, the Legislature in 1967 ordered its
legislative research committee to study further the feasibility of es-
tablishing the recommended probate district court system with full-
time judges to be appointed by the governor.69 The study was to
include a review of current workload as well as trends in the work of
the sixteen extant probate judgeships; a translation of caseload into
work time of the probate judges; consideration of travel time and
other factors implicit in full-time judgeships; and the administra-
tion, staffing, structure, organization, and operation of the probate
court system.
The legislative research committee retained the Institute of Judi-
cial Administration to do the study. The findings of fact in the
study contained no great surprises, but the ultimate recommenda-
tion surprised many: the probate courts should be abolished and
their jurisdiction should be transferred to the superior court.70 The
Institute summarized its recommendations as follows:
1. That the present part-time probate judges be replaced (as vacan-
cies occur) by full-time judges.
2. That the supreme court of probate be abolished.
3. That probate registeries be maintained in each county, conve-
niently close to the registry of deeds.
4. That the jurisdiction of the present probate courts be added to
the jurisdiction of the superior court.
5. That the present part-time registers be replaced (as vacancies
occur) by full-time registers appointed as clerks of court are now
appointed.
64. Id. at III-IV.
65. Id. at IV.
66. Id. at IV.
67. Id. at 36.
68. Id. at III. See also id. at 31.
69. 1969 IJA REPORT, supra note 61, at 1.
70. Id. at 16-17.
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6. That new superior court judges be appointed as needed."
The Institute's recommendations, with the backing of Chief Jus-
tice Williamson and the Judicial Council, seemed headed for quick
adoption. A legislative resolve in the summer of 1967 to amend the
constitution by eliminating the provision for election of judges and
registers of probate was favorably voted on by the people in Novem-
ber of 1967.72 However, since no other method of selection was yet in
place, the Governor's proclamation provided perforce that the
amendment would be effective "at such time as the Legislature by
proper enactment shall establish a different Probate Court system
with full-time judges."7 3 That time has not yet arrived.
A bill introduced in 1969 to carry out the recommendations of the
Institute's 1967 study was withdrawn.7 ' A bill in 1973 calling for ap-
pointment of probate judges was soundly defeated in the House . 7
Some legislators opposed to the bill declared that local election of
probate judges and registers helped keep their constituents inter-
ested in exercising their electoral franchise; others expressed disap-
proval of any further attrition of county autonomy; still others fore-
saw increased costs to the state .7 The fact that a majority of voters
had approved the constitutional amendment of 1967 was simply
disregarded.
Despite all the alterations in the Maine court system since 1973,
the statutory provisions for election of part-time probate judges and
registers have not been touched. Although some of the language of
the act of 1975, describing the administrative powers of the chief
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, refers broadly to "all courts,"
the context seems to limit the references to courts of the "Judicial
Department. 7 7  Chief Justices Dufresne and McKusick never
treated their administrative authority as extending to the probate
71. Id. at 25-26.
72. Const. Res. 1967, ch. 77, passed in 1967. The vote in November, 1967, was
41,850 for the amendment and 34,301 opposed. 1969 Me. Laws 2141 (proclamation by
the Governor).
73. 1969 Me. Laws 2141-42 (proclamation by the Governor).
74. 1 Legis. Rec. 1380 (1969).
75. 1 Legis. Rec. 1019 (statement of Rep. Jalbert), 1020 (statement of Rep. Cote).
1242 (statement of Rep. Ross) (1973).
76. L.D. 839 (106th Legis. 1973). The Senate passed the bill, but the House de-
feated it. 1 Legis. Rec. 1022-23, 1242-43 (1973).
77. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1 (1989) provides in part:
The Chief Justice, as the head of the Judicial Department, shall, in accor-
dance with the rules, regulations and orders of the Supreme Judicial Court,
be responsible for the efficient operation of the Judicial Department and for
the expeditious dispatch of litigation therein and for the proper conduct of
business in all courts. The Chief Justice may require reports from all courts
in the State and may issue orders and regulations necessary for the efficient
operation of the Judicial Department and the prompt and proper adminis-
tration of justice.
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courts. Still funded by the counties pursuant to statute, they remain
outside the "judicial department" of the state.
Yet the probate courts did not remain totally beyond the emerg-
ing central governance of the Maine judicial system. In 1977 the
Legislature explicitly included the probate judges within the ambit
of rules to be prescribed by the Supreme Judicial Court with regard
to discipline, disability, retirement, or removal of judges .7 The high
court had adopted in 1974, with the force of a rule, a "Code of Judi-
cial Conduct," containing seven canons or precepts for behavior of
district, superior, and Supreme Judicial Court judges.7 9 In response
to the 1977 legislation, the court amended the Code in 1978 to in-
clude probate judges within the first three canons.80
Two other improvements came from an unexpected quarter. In
1979, after years of study by a legislative commission, the Legisla-
ture enacted, effective January 1, 1981, the Maine Probate Code,
modelled after the Uniform Probate Code adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.' Though
principally addressing problems of substantive law, the Code con-
tained also provisions affecting procedure. Section 1-308 of the Code
provided for direct appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of final
judgments and orders of the probate courts. There would be no
more de novo trials in superior court as a method of review.
More important was section 1-304, which gave the Supreme Judi-
cial Court power to prescribe by general rules the forms, practice
and procedure, including rules of evidence, to be followed in all pro-
ceedings under the Probate Code and all appeals therefrom. At the
moment the Code became effective, on January 1, 1981, the new
78. P.L. 1977, ch. 638 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-B (1989)).
79. The Code of Judicial Conduct had been "adopted, prescribed and given the
force of a Rule pursuant to the inherent power of this Court" in April, 1974, by Or-
der, Me. Rptr., 313-319 A.2d XXXVII. See infra text accompanying notes 116-118.
80. Order, Me. Rptr., 392-395 A.2d LVI, effective Dec. 15, 1978.
81. P.L. 1979, ch. 540, § 1 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A (1981
& Supp. 1990)). The Commission on Revision of the Probate Laws had been estab-
lished and funded by P.& S.L. 1973, ch. 126. The original composition of the Com-
mission was interesting in view of the fact that it would be dealing with politically
sensitive matters: The governor was to appoint two lawyers from a state bar associa-
tion list, one representative of the Corporate Fiduciary Association, one chartered life
underwriter, one representative of labor, and two public representatives; the presi-
dent of the Senate was to appoint two senators, and the speaker of the House was to
appoint three members of the House. Three probate judges were to serve as
consultants.
On the effective date of the Maine Probate Code (January 1, 1981), the Maine
Rules of Probate Procedure also went into effect, and the Advisory Committee on
Probate Rules was permanently established. Order, Me. Rptr., 418-427 A.2d XXXI,
XCI. Professor Merle Loper of the University of Maine School of Law and the author
(the latter briefly) served as counsel to the Commission, and Professor L. Kinvin
Wroth served as procedural consultant. Professors Wroth and Loper later served as
counsel and reporters for the Advisory Committee.
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rules of probate procedure and the official forms were ready and
available. The old problem, of finding a suitable mechanism for
achieving uniformity of forms and procedures among the sixteen
probate courts, was finally resolved.
But the awkward matter of law practice by part-time probate
judges remains, as does the independent election of part-time regis-
ters. The recommendation in 1969 by the Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration was well grounded. The probate courts should be part
of the judicial department of the state.
Despite the rebuffs in the Legislature in 1969 in the matter of the
clerks of court and in 1973 in the matter of the probate judges, the
proponents of further structural change did not cease their efforts.
We have seen that the Legislature of 1969 gave the chief justice the
authority to designate the times for holding terms of court for the
superior court, ending the old statutory term system.8 2 The same
Legislature by resolution authorized and funded a study by the Ju-
dicial Council of "the operational aspects of the Supreme Judicial
and Superior Courts, particularly in the area of finances, facilities
and personnel."83
Again the Judicial Council, still under the leadership of Chief Jus-
tice Williamson, engaged the Institute of Judicial Administration to
make the study. The Institute's report, submitted in January, 1971,
contained over 130 recommendations, including the following.
(1) Provide for state rather than county funding of the opera-
tions of the Supreme Judicial Court and superior courts.
(2) Abolish the term system for holding court. Although the stat-
utory prescription of term times for the superior court in each
county had been abolished in 1969, the chief justice still had to
designate terms for holding court as the basis for assignment ofjustices to the several counties. Whenever the work to be done
proved to exceed the predetermined duration of the term, delay
resulted and a backlog formed.
(3) Divide the state into regions for operation of the superior
court and authorize the chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Court
to designate a regional presiding justice in each region with author-
ity to supervise all judicial activities within the region, including
scheduling of terms and assignment of justices.
(4) Give the court system authority to hire its own clerks of
court.
(5) Authorize the chief justice to assign temporarily a superior
court justice to hear district court matters or a district court judge
to hear superior court matters.
(6) Set up a program for continuing education of judges of all the
courts.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 19 and 57.
83. Resolves 1969, cit 71. A continuing appropriation of $20,000 was made for the
study, which became the 1971 IJA RnPor, supra note 12.
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(7) Eliminate de novo trials in superior court of district court
criminal cases. As a means to eliminating trial de novo in many
cases, the report suggested either (a) adoption of a constitutional
amendment which would rescind the right to trial by jury for petty
criminal offenses or (b) creation by legislation of a new category of
offenses entitled "infractions." In routine traffic cases the superior
court was being harassed by appeals from the district court, accom-
panied by demands for jury trials.
(8) Authorize the employment of law clerks to serve the justices
of the Supreme Judicial Court and superior courts.
(9) Enlarge the responsibilities of the administrative assistant to
the chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Court by having the ad-
ministrative assistant take charge of all judicial support functions
within the state and ensure compliance with the rules, policies, and
directives of the Supreme Judicial Court and the chief justice relat-
ing to matters of administration.
(10) Require the chief justice to prepare each year a report on
the state of the judiciary. 4
The Legislature did not respond to the recommendations of the
1971 report of the Institute with the alacrity it had shown in 1961 in
carrying out the proposal for the district court. With respect to the
de novo trial problem, it defeated proposals to amend the state con-
stitution to limit the right to jury trial for minor offenses.85 The Su-
preme Judicial Court itself, sitting as the Law Court, had to strike
down on constitutional grounds a measure that would have denied
jury trial for violation of the traffic laws: As long as traffic offenses
were treated as criminal, the court held, defendants had a right to
jury trial under the Maine Constitution.8
The Institute's recommendation for dividing the state into regions
for court administration went nowhere before 1975, as did also the
major recommendations for state funding of the superior court's
support structure and elimination of that court's dependence on the
elected county clerks. The term system continued.
Some of the less important recommendations of the 1971 report
were carried out within the court system as far as they could be
without major enabling legislation. Chief Justice Dufresne began in
1971 to include a budget item for salaries of law clerks for the Su-
preme Judicial Court and superior courts. In the summer of 1971,
law clerks began rendering badly needed assistance to the justices of
the Law Court, who were facing a rising caseload of appeals contain-
ing new and difficult legal problems. Although a law enacted in 1969
had provided for an administrative assistant to the chief justice, the
holder of that office was required to serve simultaneously as clerk of
84. 1971 IJA REPORT, supra note 12, at 66-72.
85. H. HENRY, supra note 13, at 33 n.12.
86. State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974). See supra note 43.
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the Law Court and reporter of decisions.87 It was impossible for one
person holding all three positions even to begin carrying out the im-
portant oversight functions recommended in the 1971 report for the
administrative assistant to the chief justice.
Although the 105th and 106th Legislatures did little to address
directly the basic structural problems of the court system, the 106th
Legislature did create, in July, 1973, a commission to "prepare legis-
lation revising the trial court system."s That commission, known as
the Trial Court Revision Commission, financed partly with a small
appropriation and partly with a grant from the Law Enforcement
Planning and Assistance Agency, was charged to address the struc-
tural impediments to greater efficiency of the trial courts. The Com-
mission was created in response to growing dissatisfaction of the
bench and bar with the existing archaic arrangements. In particular,
Chief Justice Dufresne, in an influential essay in the Maine Law Re-
view, had warned in 1972 that prolonged failure to carry out the
1971 recommendations of the Institute of Judicial Administration
could lead to a breakdown in the rendition of justice in the state.80
The Maine Trial Court Revision Commission retained the Na-
tional Center for State Courts to do the study, which was designed
to have a somewhat broader scope than the 1971 study by the Insti-
tute of Judicial Administration. 0 The new commission was to make
recommendations regarding the district court as well as the superior
court. The legislative charge to the Commission included no explicit
reference to the probate courts, and there seems to have been a tacit
understanding that the study would not cover them. The Commis-
sion's study made a few glancing references to the probate courts
and advised that one probate judge be included among appoint-
ments to a "Maine Judicial Conference" which it recommended be
established.
87. P.L. 1969, ch. 467, § 1, repealed P.L. 1979, ch. 13, § 1. The office of Adminis-
trative Assistant to the Chief Justice was abolished in 1979, when it appeared that
the functions of the office were being performed by the Administrative Office of the
Courts, established in 1975.
88. P. & S.L. 1973, ch. 139, § 1. Chair of the Commission was Joseph & Brennan,
then a state senator, and vice chair was Professor Judy Potter of the University of
Maine Law School Other members were Attorney General Jon Lund, Thomas Dela-
hanty II (currently Chief Justice of the Superior Court), William E. McLaughlin,
Gerald F. Petrucceli, Lewis Vafiades and John Walker. The Commission had the
support of three judicial advisors, four consultants and a project staff of fifteen per-
sons. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PUB. No. R0020. ADMINISTRATnT UNIFICA-
TION OF THE MAINE STATE CouRsS i-ii (1975) [hereinafter 1975 NATIONAL CE.ra
REPORT].
89. Dufresne, Maine's Judicial Machinery at the Crossroads, 24 NLINE L RE'. 35
(1972).
90. Compare P. & S.L. 1973, ci. 139, § 1 (proposing merger and reorganization of
the trial courts) with Resolves 1969, ch. 71 (authorizing study of operational aspects
of the Supreme Judicial Court and superior courts).
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The report of the Commission, 1 rendered to the 107th Legislature
in 1975, closely tracked the Institute's 1971 study in its most impor-
tant recommendations. One obvious defect in the organization of the
Maine courts lay in the lack of integration of the district courts with
the rest of the judicial system. One possible way of correcting the
defect would have been, of course, to unite the district court with
the superior court to form one trial court. By a slim majority, the
Commission rejected that solution, most of the members believing
that it would lead to strong opposition in the Legislature which
might endanger other much needed reforms. Instead, the Commis-
sion report adopted the Institute recommendation that the state be
divided into four regions, each with a regional presiding superior
court justice, designated by the chief justice, located at a court
center in each region, with administrative jurisdiction over all courts
in that region.
92
The original idea was that the chief justice of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court would assign superior court justices to each region and
the chief judge of the district court would assign district court
judges to each region; ,within each region the justices and judges
would come under the assignment jurisdiction of the regional presid-
ing justice. However, among the drafts of proposed statutes that ac-
companied the Commission's report, there was no reference to any
inclusion of district judges within the administrative authority of a
regional presiding justice. Needless to say, the chief judge of the dis-
trict court was not pleased by the idea of losing control over district
court judges once they had been assigned out to regions. In another
twist, however, the report recommended that the statute defining
the duties of the chief judge of the district court be amended to
provide that the chief judge was to be not only "responsible to" but
"under the supervision of" the chief justice.9 3 The Commission per-
haps thought that the chief justice could effectively order the chief
judge to assign district judges to an administrative region as the rec-
ommended plan provided. In fact, however, they were never so as-
signed. The district court was never integrated with the superior
court in the fashion contemplated by the Institute's 1971
recommendations.
One of the features of the 1975 report that may have helped to
bring about its implementation by the Legislature was that it set
forth in detail the proposed constitutional and statutory amend-
ments and repealers that would be required to carry out the Com-
mission's recommendations. The required legislative surgery was
fully disclosed to legislators in the report itself. Furthermore, even
when the effect of the proposed legislation would be to diminish
91. 1975 NATIONAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 88.
92. Id. at 2-3, 15-27.
93. Id. at 108.
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county autonomy-as by giving the chief justice authority to ap-
point clerks of court-the diminution seemed relatively unimportant
in the context of a major overhaul of the system. Finally, the whole
package was sweetened for the counties by the prospect of some fis-
cal relief from having to support the superior court. With no visible
opposition, the 107th Legislature responded favorably to the Com-
mission's report, enacting chapter 408 of the public laws of 1975 and
bringing about the most sweeping changes ever made in the judicial
system of Maine.
The 1975 statute ended the dependency of the superior court and
the Supreme Judicial Court on the counties for courtrooms, cham-
bers and other office space and for office supplies and equipment,
and it ended the long reign of the elective county clerks as clerks of
court-reversing the 1969 victory of the counties in the Legisla-
ture 5 Clerks of the judicial courts were thenceforth to be appointed
by the courts. The term system was abolished; the chief justice was
by order to divide the state into judicial regions for administrative
and venue purposes, designating within each region a regional court
center and assigning a regional presiding justice of the superior
court to be responsible for the administration of justice within the
region. The duties of the regional presiding justices were to be deter-
mined by rule of the Supreme Judicial Court. The chief justice had
the responsibility for assigning superior court justices to each of the
judicial regions. Relief from that responsibility did not come until
1984 with the creation of the office of Chief Justice of the Superior
Court.9 6
Within the limits of appropriations, the chief justice of the Su-
preme Judicial Court was empowered to authorize expenditure of
funds for necessary expenses and capital improvements for the su-
preme judicial and superior courts. The chief justice was given con-
trol over the budget of all the "judicial courts."0 7 The chief judge of
the district court was thenceforth to submit the annual budget of
that court to the chief justice. The district court budget was no
longer to be rendered independently from the budget of the other
judicial courts.
The worst of the ancient "impediments to the greater efficiency"
of the superior court having been removed, the statute vested in the
Supreme Judicial Court "general administrative and supervisory au-
94. P.L. 1975, ch. 408, § 12 (current version at M. REv STAT, ANN tit. 4, § 115
(1989)) (quarters and furnishings), and P.L. 1975, ch. 408, §§ 2, 3 (current version at
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 4, § 4 (3)(B)(1989)) (office supplies and telephone tolls).
95. P.L. 1975, ch. 408, § 21 (current version at Ma. Rav STAT. ANN tit. 4. § 551
(1989)).
96. P.L. 1983, ch. 269, § 7 (current version at ME. Rav STAT_ ANN tit. 4, § 101-A
(1989)).
97. P.L. 1975, ch. 408, § 7 (current version at M. REv STAT. ANa tit. 4, § 24
(1989)).
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thority over the Judicial Department" and gave it authority to
"make and promulgate rules, regulations and orders governing the
administration of the Judicial Department.""8 The office of chief jus-
ticeship was about to become a powerful one. In accordance with
rules, regulations, and orders of the Supreme Judicial Court, the
chief justice was to be responsible for "the efficient operation of the
Judicial Department and for the expeditious dispatch of litigation
therein and for the proper conduct of business in all courts." 99
To carry out the heavy administrative responsibility about to be
placed on the chief justice, the 1975 statute created the Administra-
tive Office of the Courts, to be directed by the state court adminis-
trator, who would be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the
chief justice. The Supreme Judicial Court itself, as distinguished
from the chief justice, was given little direct control over the state
court administrator. The court may prescribe the qualifications of
the administrator's employees, but authority to hire and fire those
employees was reserved to the administrator with the approval of
the chief justice.
The following provisions of the Act stated expressly the duties to
be performed by the state court administrator:
The State Court Administrator under the supervision of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court shall:
1. Continuous survey and study. Carry on a continu-
ous survey and study of the organization, operation, condi-
tion of business, practice and procedure of the Judicial
Department and make recommendations to the Chief Jus-
tice concerning the number of judges and other judicial
personnel required for the efficient administration of jus-
tice. Assist in long and short range planning;
2. Examine the status of dockets. Examine the status
of dockets of all courts so as to determine cases and other
judicial business that have been unduly delayed. From
such reports, the administrator shall indicate which courts
are in need of additional judicial personnel and make rec-
ommendations to the Chief Justice concerning the assign-
ment or reassignment of personnel to courts that are in
need of such personnel. The administrator shall also carry
out the directives of the Chief Justice as to the assignment
of personnel in these instances;
3. Investigate complaints. Investigate complaints with
respect to the operation of the courts;
4. Examine statistical systems. Examine the statisti-
cal systems of the courts and make recommendations for a
uniform system of judicial statistics. The administrator
98. P.L. 1975, ch. 408, § 1 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1
(1989)).
99. Id.
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shall also collect and analyze statistical and other data re-
lating to the business of the courts;
5. Prescribe uniform administrative and business
methods, etc. Prescribe uniform administrative and bus-
iness methods, systems, forms, docketing and records to
be used in all state courts;
6. Implement standards and policies set by the
Chief Justice. Implement standards and policies set by
the Chief Justice regarding hours of court, the assignment
of terms parts, judges and justices;
7. Act as fiscal officer. Act as fiscal officer of the courts
and in so doing-
A. Maintain fiscal controls and accounts of funds
appropriated for the Judicial Department;
B. Prepare all requisitions for the payment of
state moneys appropriated for the maintenance
and operation of the Judicial Department;
C. Prepare budget estimates of state appropria-
tions necessary for the maintenance and opera-
tion of the Judicial Department and make recom-
mendations with respect thereto;
D. Collect statistical and other data and make re-
ports to the Chief Justice relating to the expendi-
tures of public moneys for the maintenance and
operation of the Judicial Department;
E. Develop a uniform set of accounting and budg-
etary accounts for all courts in the Judicial De-
partment and serve as auditor of the Judicial
Department;
8. Examine arrangements for use and mainte-
nance of court facilities. Examine the arrangements
for the use and maintenance of court facilities and super-
vise the purchase, distribution, exchange and transfer of
judicial equipment and supplies thereof;
9. Act as secretary. Act as secretary to the Judicial
Conference;
10. Submit an annual report. Submit an annual report
to the Chief Justice, Legislature and Governor of the ac-
tivities and accomplishments of the office for the preced-
ing calendar year;
11. Maintain liaison. Maintain liaison with the execu-
tive and the legislative branches and other public and pri-
vate agencies whose activities impact the Judicial
Department;
12. Prepare and plan clerical offices. Prepare and
plan for the organization and operation of clerical offices
serving the Superior and District Courts within each
county. Provide for a central clerk of court office at each
county seat with satellite clerk in each court;
13. Implement preservice and inservice educa-
tional and training programs. Develop and imple-
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ment preservice and inservice educational and training
programs for judicial and nonjudicial personnel of the Ju-
dicial Department; and
14. Perform duties and attend other matters. Per-
form such other duties and attend to such other matters
consistent with the powers delegated herein assigned to
him by the Chief Justice and the Supreme Judicial
Court.100
The powers and duties thus described were extensive and de-
manding. Through their performance by the Administrative Office
of the Courts, the chief justice could exercise powers and carry out
duties created by other statutes as well as by provisions of the 1975
act. Moreover, certain statutory responsibilities of the state court
administrator implied the existence of authority in the chief justice
that might not be so readily inferred merely from the Act's general
provision that the chief justice shall have responsibility "for the effi-
cient operation of the Judicial Department and for the expeditious
dispatch of litigation therein and for the proper conduct of business
in all courts."''1 1 It would not be entirely certain, for instance, that
by itself this general prescription of responsibility authorized the
chief justice to order a revision of the existing methods of the dis-
trict court for docketing and managing its cases.
As we have seen, the district court had enjoyed considerable au-
tonomy since its founding in 1961 and had handled its own heavy
caseload since then with at least tolerable success. Without the fifth
mandate of the 1975 statute to the state court administrator to pre-
scribe uniform administrative and business methods, systems, forms,
docketing, and records to be used in all state courts, there might
have been room for some doubt whether it was the legislative intent
to subject district court case management to control by the chief
justice. But the direct legislative command to the administrator
could leave no reasonable doubt: Since the administrator was or-
dered by statute to bring district court case management into line,
the chief justice had the authority and duty to support the adminis-
trator's intrusion into that area of district court administration.
The first state court administrator, Elizabeth D. Belshaw, lost no
time in setting about to fulfill her statutory mandate. 10 2 Many
judges of the district court were not happy with the prospective in-
vasion of new methods and protested to the Chief Justice. With
commendable firmness and fidelity to the purposes of the 1975 legis-
lation, Chief Justice Dufresne, with the backing of the Supreme Ju-
100. P.L. 1975, ch. 408, § 5-A (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 4, § 17
(1989 & Supp. 1990)).
101. P.L. 1975, ch. 408, § 1 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1
(1989)).
102. H. HENRY, supra note 13, at 38.
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dicial Court, fully supported the administrator.103 By the end of his
tenure in September, 1977, Chief Justice Dufresne had accom-
plished some difficult personnel actions to assure that the provisions
of the 1975 law were effectively carried out.
A major purpose of the 1975 act was indeed to end the isolation of
the district court and integrate it with the rest of the system. Be-
sides the provisions directing the state court administrator to pre-
scribe uniform administrative and business methods throughout the
judicial department, the statute contained several provisions di-
rectly promoting integration of the district court with the rest of the
system. As noted earlier in this essay, the chief judge was not only to
be "responsible to" the chief justice but to serve "under the supervi-
sion of the Chief Justice or his delegate."'10 The statistics collected
by the chief judge were to be compiled as requested by the chief
justice or his delegate.105 The district court annual budget was to be
submitted to the chief justice, and the chief judge was to perform
such additional duties as might be assigned by the chief justice.
Powers of the chief judge not enumerated but necessary or desirable
for proper administration of the courts were reserved to the Su-
preme Judicial Court.106 Finally, the act created a Judicial Confer-
ence of Maine composed of both judges and justices, to advise and
consult with the Supreme Judicial Court on matters affecting the
administration of the judicial department.0
After fourteen years of existence with virtually no administrative
tie to the rest of the judicial department except for the appointive
and dismissal power of the chief justice over the chief judge, the
district court had been brought into one system with the Supreme
Judicial Court and the superior courts. For the first time in history,
Maine had a reasonably good structure for a coordinated system of
trial and appellate courts, with responsibility placed squarely on the
Supreme Judicial Court and its chief justice and with administrative
machinery adequate to carry out that responsibility-subject always,
of course, to the Legislature's willingness to fund the system
adequately.
There were still some loose ends. The administrative court, which
had been constituted a court of record in 1973,108 remained outside
103. Id. at 39.
104. P.L. 1975, ch. 408, § 14 (current version at Ma. REv, STAT. AN. tit. 4. § 164
(1989 & Supp. 1990)).
105. P.L. 1975, cl. 408, § 15 (current version at M. REv STAT ANN. tit. 4, §
164(7) (1989)).
106. P.L. 1975, ch. 408, § 19 (current version at M& Rav. STAT ANN, tit. 4, §
164(14) (1989)).
107. P.L. 1975, ch. 408, § 19-A (current version at a. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 471
(1989)).
108. P.L. 1973, ctL 303. The administrative court, with two judges, has jurisdiction
over certain types of cases relating to denial, suspension or revocation of license by
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the system, as did the sixteen probate courts with their elected reg-
istrars and part-time judges, their special rule-making procedure
and the odd arrangement for appeal of their decisions by de novo
trials in the superior court "sitting as the Supreme Court of Pro-
bate." No provision had yet been made to coordinate the operations
of the eighteen county law libraries, which had always been funded
by the counties.109 The 1975 act provided for funding of those librar-
ies by the state rather than the counties, but it created no mecha-
nism for establishing policies on acquisitions, staffing and manage-
ment. A few of the county law libraries had been carefully managed
by their law library associations, but most had been operated with
part-time untrained staff and had deteriorated."10
When Vincent McKusick succeeded Armand Dufresne as chief
justice in September of 1977, most of the principal institutions of
the present court system were in place and working. During the last
two years of his tenure, Chief Justice Dufresne and the Supreme
Judicial Court had been carrying out the internal reforms directed
by the 1975 act, initially over protests by some judges and clerks of
the trial courts who disliked the intrusion of the Administrative Of-
fice of the Courts into their operations."" By the time Chief Justice
McKusick entered on his duties, internal resistance to the new ar-
rangements had died down. Even with the full cooperation of all
concerned, however, the mass of administrative duties confronting
the new chief justice and the court was formidable.
A hallmark of the new regime was to be the establishment by
court orders of a network of committees to assist in formulating in-
licensing agencies of state government. The court was admitted to the judicial depart-
ment in 1978 by P.L. 1977, ch. 551, § 1, effective July 1, 1978 (current version at ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 1151-1158 (1989 & Supp. 1990)). Its decisions are reviewable
for error of law by the superior court. M. Admin. C.R. 73.
109. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, ch. 7 (1964), repealed by P.L. 1981, ch. 510, § 2.
110. 1971 IJA REPORT, supra note 12, at 65. Not until 1981 was the deplorable
situation of the county law libraries straightened out by P.L. 1981, ch. 510, § 1, which
created a State Court Library Committee, to be appointed by the chief justice as a
governing board for all the former county law libraries. The Act called for appoint-
ment of a trained state court library supervisor, to serve in the Administrative Office
of the Courts and to plan for and coordinate the activities of the former county law
libraries. The governing statutory provisions are ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, ch. 6
(1989 & Supp. 1990)). The state and county law library system is an essential institu-
tion for proper functioning of the Maine courts.
111. H. HENRY, supra note 13, at 38-39. Silsby, supra note 13, at 178, col. 3. The
opponents of the new regime attempted to repeal the legislation of 1975 or strangle
the system by budgetary cuts but without much success. They did succeed, however,
in getting the Legislature to enact P.L. 1977, ch. 544, which contained a number of
provisions requiring approval or permission of the chief judge of the district court
before the state court administrator could install uniform business methods, systems,
forms and records, and uniform accounting in the district court. This strange piece of
legislation (the chief judge still held office at the pleasure of the chief justice) was
finally repealed, in effect, by P.L. 1983, ch. 269, § 3.
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ternal policies and procedures for carrying out legislative mandates.
When Chief Justice McKusick was appointed, there were only five
advisory committees reporting to the Supreme Judicial Court- the
advisory committees on civil rules, criminal rules, and rules of evi-
dence, the committee on judicial records and an advisory committee
on court administration, policies and procedures. Three committees
then reported to the chief justice: a committee on court management
and policy, a continuing judicial education committee, and a com-
mittee on the annual judicial conference. By the end of 1990, mostly
as a result of legislation enlarging the responsibilities of the high
court and the chief justice, the array of committees and boards re-
porting to them was as follows: 112
Reporting to the Supreme Judicial Court
Board of Examiners for the Examination of Applicants for Admis-
sion to the Bar
Board of Overseers of the Bar
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability
Advisory Committee on Professional Responsibility
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee on Judicial Records
Advisory Committee on Probate Rules
Advisory Committee on the Code of Judicial Conduct
Reporting to the Chief Justice
Committee on Continuing Judicial Education
Committee on Court-Appointed Counsel
Committee on the Judicial Conference
Court Mediation Committee
Judicial Department Legislation Committee
Judicial Policy Committee
State Court Library Committee
In the intervening years other committees had been created to
deal ad hoc with problems as they emerged, and had been later dis-
charged or reorganized as problems were brought under control. For
example, the Advisory Committee on Court Administration, Policies
and Procedures, established in March of 1977 to report to the Su-
preme Judicial Court, ceased to function in 1986. A committee on
court reporters, established in 1978, disappeared in 1983. An advi-
sory committee on court-bar association relations came and went, as
did a committee on court facilities, whose functions became ab-
sorbed into the operations of the Administrative Office of the
Courts. The Committee on Collective Bargaining for Judicial De-
partment Employees lasted as long as necessary to provide policy
guidance to the state court administrator in instituting collective
112. 1990 ANNuAL REPoRT, supra note 34, at 29-35.
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bargaining pursuant to a statute and order in 1983.113
The titles of the committees themselves reflect the major respon-
sibilities placed on or assumed by the Supreme Judicial Court and
the chief justice. The rules of evidence had gone into effect during
the last eighteen months of Chief Justice Dufresne's tenure, having
been prepared by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence
pursuant to an enabling statute in 1973.114 Except in certain types of
proceedings,11 5 those rules are applicable to all the courts of the
state, including the probate courts.
The Supreme Judicial Court formed the Committee on Judicial
Responsibility and Disability in 1977 under the direction of a stat-
ute requiring that such a committee be set up."" Its function was
not just to recommend rules, but to make investigations and recom-
mendations to the court in regard to discipline, disability, retire-
ment or removal of judges of all the courts, including the probate
courts. Accordingly, that committee has been an operating commit-
tee, not an advisory one. Its procedures were established in 1978 by
rules which, as amended from time to time, set forth the composi-
tion of the Committee and the investigative procedures to be fol-
lowed when a complaint is lodged against a Maine judge.117 Al-
though the Committee may dismiss complaints after investigation, it
has no power to impose discipline. If the Committee believes that
discipline may be warranted, it reports its findings of fact and con-
clusions of law to the Supreme Judicial Court for appropriate
action.118
On its own initiative, asserting an inherent supervisory power, the
113. See infra text accompanying notes 122-25.
114. Promulgation Order, Me. Rptr., 336-343 A.2d XL, effective February 2, 1976.
The initial Advisory Committee for Rules of Evidence had been chaired by Robert B.
Williamson after his retirement as Chief Justice. Other members included Franklin
G. Hinckley, Lynwood E. Hand, David A. Nichols (later a justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court), Frank E. Hancock, Ralph I. Lancaster, and Jack H. Simmons. The
original consultants had been Richard H. Field, of the Harvard Law School faculty,
and Peter L. Murray, of Portland. Order, Me. Rptr., 293-299 A.2d XLV-VI.
115. M.R.Evid. 1101. The administrative court is not specified in subsection (a) as
a court to which the Rules of Evidence are applicable, but M. Admin. C.R. 43 pro-
vides that Rule 43 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure governs procedure in the
administrative court "so far as applicable." Subsection (a) of M.R. Civ. P. 43 in turn
provides: "All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of
this state, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of this state." M.R.
Civ. P. 43(a).
Excepted proceedings include, among others, grand jury proceedings and small
claims proceedings before rendition of judgment. M.R.Evid. 1101(b).
116. The Committee was established by order of the Supreme Judicial Court, ef-
fective July 5, 1978, Me. Rptr., 385-388 A.2d LX, and pursuant to P.L. 1977, ch. 638
(current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-B (1989)).
117. The original order establishing the Committee on Judicial Responsibility and
Disability was promulgated on June 26, 1978, effective July 5, 1978.
118. See RULES OF THE COMMIrEE ON JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DISABILITY 3.
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court adopted the Maine Bar Rules, effective November 1, 1978, to
govern the professional conduct of Maine attorneys. Rule 3 was a
code of professional responsibility, modeled after the American Bar
Association 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsiblity and Dis-
ciplinary Rules.119 Other rules established the Board of Overseers of
the Bar and several subsidiary institutions deemed necessary for the
Board's operation: a grievance commission, a bar counsel (with a
role comparable to that of a prosecutor), a professional ethics com-
mission, and a fee arbitration commission. Every Maine lawyer must
register each year with the Board and pay an annual fee, established
by the Supreme Judicial Court, to meet the expenses of administra-
tion of the system. 20 The constitutionality of the arrangement was
challenged by a dissident member of the bar but was upheld by the
Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, on appeal.' 21
Other duties and activities besides those reflected in the titles of
the various boards and committees have occupied the thought and
effort of Chief Justice McKusick and the Supreme Judicial Court
during his tenure. To list a few at random: the construction and im-
provement of court facilities; a thorough revision of small claims
procedures; revisions of the bail system and the grand jury system;
training sessions for law clerks and court clerks; computerization of
the whole court system except the probate courts; liaison with the
Maine Criminal Justice Planning and Assistance Agency while it
was in existence; liaison with the Maine Criminal Justice Sentencing
Institute; general supervision of a project in 1980-1981 to improve
the selection and management of jurors; liaison with the Maine
Commission on Domestic Abuse; liaison with the Supreme Judicial
Court Plan and Design Commission, a legislative commission study-
ing possibilities for a new Supreme Judicial Court building in
Augusta.
An important development in 1984 was the enactment of the Ju-
dicial Employees Labor Relations Act, giving employees of the judi-
cial department the rights to engage in collective bargaining, join
labor organizations of their own choosing, and be represented by
119. The Supreme Judicial Court first promulgated the Maine Bar Rules reserv-
ing Rule 3 (to be the Code of Professional Responsibility). Order Adopting Rules 1-2
and 4-10 of the Maine Bar Rules, Me. Rptr., 392-395 A.2d XXIL An order amending
Rules 1 and 2 and 4-10 was promulgated with the new Rule 3 the following year,
effective May 15, 1979. Order, Me. Rptr., 396-400 A.2d LVII. The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility was initially prepared by the fifteen-person Select Commission
on Professional Responsibility, headed by President Robert Strider of Colby College.
Dean Bert S. Prunty, of the University of Maine School of Law, served as counsel and
reporter. Order, Jan. 17, 1978, Me. Rptr., 381-384 A.2d LXIX.
120. M. Bar R 6.
121. Board of Overseers v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998 (Me. 1980). The gravamen of Lee's
complaint was that the registration fee constituted a tax, which only the Legislature
has power to exact. Id. at 1003-1004.
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those organizations in their employment relations with the judicial
department.1 22 To allay any doubts about the constitutionality of
that statute-doubts grounded in the separation-of-powers clause of
the Maine Constitution-the Supreme Judicial Court itself issued
an order also authorizing collective bargaining for judicial employ-
ees.123 The Administrative Office of the Courts had done much since
1975 to rationalize the personnel system of the judicial department,
and by 1984 it had also had the benefit of an independent personnel
study completed in 1981 by Arthur Young & Company. 2" The ad-
justments necessary to carry on collective bargaining without undue
disruption were not exceptionally difficult. The Maine Labor Rela-
tions Board now exercises almost the same functions and authority
with respect to judicial employees' collective bargaining as it exer-
cises with respect to other state employees.12 5
The domestic relations law of Maine went through many elaborate
revisions during the 1980's. Several new sections are devoted to pro-
tection of the interests of minor children of failed or failing mar-
riages; a common feature of those sections is a provision calling for
the court to refer the battling couples to mediation. 2 ' In 1985 the
Legislature established the Court Mediation Service to provide me-
diation in both the superior and district courts throughout the
state. 2 7 The statute directed the Administrative Office of the Courts
to contract with qualified individuals to serve as mediators, and it
directed the chief justice to appoint a court mediation committee to
set policy for and monitor the Service. Mediation is required in all
contested domestic relations cases when minor children are in-
volved, and it may be required for parties in small-claims cases. The
Service may mediate only cases pending in the courts. In fiscal year
1989-1990, a total of 5,596 cases were sent to mediation, of which
122. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1281-1294 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
123. Administrative Order in Regard to Judicial Employees Labor Relations, ef-
fective July 25, 1984, Me. Rptr., 467-478 A.2d LXXXIX-XCIV. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court had cooperated with legislative leaders through an advisory committee on
collective bargaining for judicial department employees.
124. ARTHUR YOUNG & CO., MAINE JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES LABOR RELATIONS (1981).
That report to the state court administrator had evaluated the existing personnel
classification and compensation system and had documented current market salaries
for court positions.
125. Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, ch. 14 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (judicial
employees) with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, ch. 9-B (state employees). There are
minor differences. For example, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1285(5)(1988), permits
the parties to agree in advance to a mediation-arbitration procedure in the case of
judicial employees, whereas the cognate provisions for bargaining procedure in the
case of state employees, 26 M.R.S.A. tit. 26, § 979-D (1988), contains no such
authorization.
126. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 214, 581, 636, 665, 752 (Supp. 1990).
127. P.L. 1985, ch. 396, § 1 (current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 18
(1989 & Supp. 1990)).
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slightly more than half were resolved without trial.'28
That further restructuring of the courts of Maine may take place
was signified in 1990 by legislation creating a large commission,
known as the Commission to Study the Future of Maine's Courts, to
study the court system and "make recommendations as necessary to
ensure that the judicial needs of citizens will be met in the 21st cen-
tury".129 To be re-examined, among other things, are some of the
proposals made during earlier studies that have not yet been
adopted, such as unification of the trial courts, establishment of an
intermediate appellate court, and resolution of the conflict-of-inter-
est problem of the probate judges.
Some interesting minor changes in court structure during the past
few years have had a decentralizing effect. As noted above, legisla-
tion in 1983 permitted the chief justice to designate a chief justice of
the superior court from among the justices of that court.' 0 Serving
at the pleasure and under the supervision of the chief justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court, the chief justice of the superior court is
now responsible for the operation of that court. One consequence
has been that the chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Court is no
longer directly responsible for deployment of superior court justices
throughout the former judicial regions of the state. The superior
court and district court now have their own committees on civil and
criminal forms. 131
In recent years the Legislature has occasionally assigned functions
and responsibilities directly to the Administrative Office of the
Courts and to the chief justice of the superior court or the chief
judge of the district court. The statute of 1985 setting up the Court
Mediation Service directly designated the Administrative Office of
the Courts as the contracting agency for engaging mediators.2 2 In
1985 also, the state court administrator, under supervision of the
chief justice, was directly instructed to "plan and implement ar-
rangements for safe and secure court premises" and given authority
to contract for services of qualified security personnel.13 3 Again in
1985, the Legislature placed the Court Appointed Special Advocate
Program directly under control of the chief judge of the district
court. 34 The program is designed to provide volunteer lay persons
128. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 121.
129. P.L. 1989, ch. 891, § B-5.
130. See supra note 96.
131. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 36.
132. P.L. 1985, ch. 396, § 1 (current version at M. REv. STAT ANN tit. 4. § 18
(1989)).
133. P.L. 1987, ch. 137, § 3 (current version at ME. REv STAT ANN tiL 4, § 17 (15)
(1989 & Supp. 1990)).
134. P.L. 1985, ch. 581, § 1 (current version at Ma. REv. STAT ANN tit. 4. § 1502
(1989 & Supp. 1990)). A description of the Court Appointed Special Advocate
(CASA) Program appears in 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 125.
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to serve as appointed special advocates or guardians ad litem in
child abuse and neglect cases, The only direct link to central admin-
istration appears in a provision that one member of the advisory
panel for the Program shall be the state court administrator or the
administrator's designee.'
The statute establishing the Commission to Study the Future of
Maine's Courts contains a provision directly authorizing the chief
justice of the superior court and the chief judges of the district and
administrative courts to establish a pilot project for handling of
cases arising under the domestic relations law, child protective pro-
ceedings under the child welfare laws, and "any other matters the
Chief Justice [of the Superior Court] and Chief Judges determine
appropriate."'36 The three chiefs are to report on the project to the
Commission to Study the Future of Maine's Courts.13 7 The provision
seems studiously to avoid any direct involvement of the Supreme
Judicial Court, the chief justice, or the Administrative Office of the
Courts.
One could speculate that the Legislature may be coming to recog-
nize that the administrative load that the high court, the chief jus-
tice and the Administrative Office of the Courts are bearing is ex-
tremely heavy and perhaps to think that allocating responsibilities
directly to the administrative head of the trial courts will alleviate
the burden at the top. However, any idea that the Legislature wor-
ries about overburdening the administration of the court system is
probably untenable. In the summer of 1989, an emergency measure
was enacted directing the Department of Human Services to estab-
lish a child support table by October 12, 1989, and directing the Su-
preme Judicial Court to adopt by the same date rules establishing
criteria for application of the child support table for use in judicial
proceedings."18 In the fall of 1989, the Supreme Judicial Court di-
vided, four votes to three, on whether to comply with the direc-
tive." 9 Though the court complied, three justices declined to concur,
on the ground that the provision amounted to an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the court. Writing for Justices
135. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1505 (1989).
136. P.L. 1989, ch. 891, § A-12.
137. Id.
138. P.L. 1989, ch. 365, § 1, repealing and replacing ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
303-A, relating to guidelines for child support awards. Subsection 3 of the new section
303-A directs the Supreme Judicial Court to "adopt rules establishing criteria for
application of the child support table for use in judicial proceedings to establish child
support by October 12, 1989, which rules shall provide that consideration shall be
given to the relative periods of time which a child spends with each parent and the
relative consequential financial burden this places upon each parent." Section 303-A
was repealed by P.L. 1989, ch. 834, § B-7 (effective April 17, 1990).
139. Supreme Judicial Court Administrative Order Adopting Child Support
Guidelines, No. SJC-13 (Oct. 5, 1989, effective Oct. 12, 1989).
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Roberts and Glassman also, Justice Hornby stated:
At the Legislature's direction, the Court has set out upon a path
it has never previously taken. Today the Court writes law in a con-
text divorced from the decision of any particular case and in an
area not involving the customary workaday rules of court like pro-
cedure, evidence and lawyer/judge discipline. The Child Support
Guidelines involve difficult and abstract questions of policy that
the people's elected representatives, not this Court, should decide.
At the very least, an executive agency should promulgate such rules
according to standards set by the Legislature. They would then
have the benefit of prior notice and a public hearing and be subject
to the public scrutiny inherent in executive decision making. If we
recognize today's legislative assignment as proper, what will be to-
morrow's? Devising criteria for damages in workers' compensation
or medical malpractice cases? Writing detailed rules for liability in
cases involving hazardous substances? There are many such areas
where a busy legislature could shunt aside tedious or politically dif-
ficult cases to courts; but the result would be a major alteration of
our system of state government.140
The majority of the court, issuing the order, observed:
Although mindful of the concerns expressed by our colleagues in
nonconcurrence, we issue this Administrative Order in response to
19 M.R.S.A. § 303-A(3). We are required to assume that the statute
is constitutional and we leave it to the Law Court to rule upon the
constitutionality of the statute if it is challenged in litigation. The
Legislature may choose to remove any uncertainty by enacting the
substance of the Administrative Order."'
It may be symptomatic of a change in attitude toward the separa-
tion of powers over the past thirty-five years that the Legislature,
which was once so cautious about giving the Supreme Judicial Court
rulemaking authority, seems in this case to have regarded a rules-
enabling statute as a proper device for resolving a complex question
of social policy having little to do with court procedure or organiza-
tion. The statute was soon repealed and replaced by one containing
its own child support guidelines,' 4 2 whereupon the court vacated its
order. 4 ' The incident should not be regarded as precedent for using
the high court as a kind of ad hoc administrative agency.
This brief account barely summarizes the development over
thirty-five years of the Maine court system. In 1956 it was hardly a
system at all-a mere agglomeration of courts, largely uncoordinated
in their procedures, erratic in performance, with great inequities in
personnel management and pay, lacking in any institutional encour-
140. Id. at 8-9 (statement of nonconcurrence).
141. Id. at 1.
142. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 311 (Supp. 1990).
143. Administrative Order, July 20, 1990, effective August 19, 1990, Me. Rptr.,
576-- A.2d CXLIII.
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agement of continuing education, and weak in mechanisms for su-
pervision and control. Except for the probate courts, it is now one
fully administered system with lines of administrative authority
clearly drawn, with sanctions in place for professional misbehavior
by judges or lawyers, and with an effective instrument for manage-
ment in the form of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
In reviewing those dramatic administrative improvements, one
should not lose sight of the fortunate fact that the actual perform-
ance of individual judges in their daily work remains highly inde-
pendent and largely beyond the reach of any administrative power.
Good court structure and administration make judges more produc-
tive and efficient than they might otherwise be and probably attract
abler persons to the bench, but the quality of the decisions they
render from day to day depends far more on their own ability, learn-
ing and character than on the administrative system in which they
do their work. The quality of justice in Maine will always depend
most heavily on the quality of appointments to the bench. Among
judicial appointments, however, the designation of Chief Justice of
the Supreme Judicial Court now stands in a class by itself. The
holder of that office must be not only a good judge but a person with
the concern, vision, energy, diplomatic skill, and courage to manage
the court system of Maine effectively and lead it wisely through
changes yet to come. It will not be easy to equal or surpass the per-
formances of Chief Justices Williamson, Dufresne, and McKusick.
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